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On December 13, 2009, billionaire Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi was struck in the face by a souvenir statuette while he was
greeting a nighttime crowd in Milan.! News cameras captured him
grimacing, face bloodied, as he ducked into a car and was rushed
away to a nearby hospital. Ever meticulous about his polished
appearance, the damage to Berlusconi's face - while not serious -
seemed to mirror the battering that his political image had taken in
the months prior and signaled an important, while perhaps
unintended, message: Mr. Berlusconi is not immune to attack.
The more serious assault on Berlusconi's power and influence,
however, occurred a month earlier on October 7, 2009, when the
Italian Constitutional Court overturned a law that granted immunity
from prosecution to the holders of Italy's four highest public offices,
the Prime Minister among them.3 This was of particular importance
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1. Elisabetta Povoledo & Rachel Donadio, Attacker Fractures Berlusconi's
Nose, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A5.
2. Id.
3. Rachel Donadio, Italian Court Rejects Prime Minister's Immunity, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at A6.
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to Mr. Berlusconi who, by way of the immunity law, had been able to
evade two cases against him, one in connection to a bribe that he had
paid to a British lawyer and another for alleged fraud related to the
purchase of TV rights by his media company, Mediaset.4 In the wake
of the Court's decision, with the trials against the embattled Prime
Minister set to continue, Berlusconi again pushed a measure through
Parliament that conferred temporary immunity upon Italy's highest
officeholders.! Once again, in January of 2011, the Constitutional
Court fought back, invalidating important revisions of the newest law
and forcing the Prime Minister back into a defensive position.6 In the
wake of the Court's latest decision, however, Berlusconi has shown
little willingness to give up the fight.'
Berlusconi is no stranger to legal inquiry. Despite his long
tenure at the head of the center-right in Italy, he has often been
accused of corruption, false accounting, and general abuse of power.'
Over the course of the past twenty years, he has evaded incarceration
by way of the statute of limitations in four major cases. He has been
found guilty and then acquitted on appeal in a handful of others.
Berlusconi is routinely the subject of scandalous media reports
detailing his penchant for lavish parties and younger women.10 He is
an intriguing and cunning figure whose enduring appeal in Italy is a
perplexing anomaly.
This note examines Berlusconi's place within Italy and his
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Daniel Makosky, Italy Lower House Approves Bill Protecting
Berlusconi from Prosecution, JURIST, Feb. 4, 2010, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2010/02/italy-lower-house-approves-bill-that.php.
6. John Hooper, Italian Court Waters Down Berlusconi Immunity Law,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/jan/13/italian-court-berlusconi-immunity-law.
7. Berlusconi has "no intention of stepping down, whatever the court's ruling"
on legitimate impediment law. Elisabetta Povoledo & Gaia Pianigiani, Automatic
Immunity for Berlusconi Revoked, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,2011, at All.
8. The Italian PM is current the subject of no fewer than four different legal
controversies. See, e.g., Tials and Tribulations, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2011, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/18333133.
9. See, e.g., Berlusconi Wins in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at A8; see also
Hgh Court Clears Berlusconiin '87 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at A10.
10. A recent scandal concerning so-called "bunda bunga" parties is a good
illustration. Nick Squires, Silvio Berlusconi May Have Paid for 'Bunga Bunga' Girls'





continuing, impressively successful - and oftentimes alarming -
methods to evade conviction. Section II provides an overview of the
Prime Minister's financial, legal, and political history. Section III
outlines the Italian legal system and the Italian Constitutional Court.
Section IV describes the development of the concept of immunity for
government officials, from an international and domestic standpoint.
Section V examines the history of executive and legislative immunity
within Italy, including Berlusconi's attempts to protect himself, and
the Constitutional Court's responses. Finally, Section VI evaluates
the impact that the 2009 and 2011 Constitutional Court decisions have
had on Italy and what they suggest about important targets for
judicial reform. While the recent invalidations of Berlusconi's
attempts at immunity represent an important symbolic and legal step,
strengthening the rule of law and democracy within Italy, they do not
appear to have affected Berlusconi in a meaningful way. These
decisions have, however, required creativity on his part in negotiating
the complicated legal path ahead. More importantly, though,
Berlusconi himself - and all of his legal travails - have exposed the
dangers that his conflicts of interest pose to the legitimacy of the
Italian government. Further, taking the Prime Minister's own
experience with statutes of limitations, the extreme delay and backlog
in Italian courts has serious ramifications on the effectiveness of the
justice system as a whole.
II. Being Silvio Berlusconi
A. The Media Magnate
Berlusconi was elected to his third term as Prime Minister on
April 14, 2008, at the age of seventy-one, making him the second
longest-serving Prime Minister in the history of Italy." While his
tanned visage has been the leading face of Italian politics for fifteen
years, his influence over Italy extends far beyond the political.
Berlusconi is one of Italy's richest men, with a fortune estimated to be
in the billions12 owed mostly to a vast media empire - Mediaset -
11. Berlusconi is the longest-serving Prime Minister of Italy since 1946, the time
of the founding of the First Italian Republic.
12. In 2011, Forbes estimated the net worth of Berlusconi and his family to be
$7.8 billion, the third highest among Italians. See The World's Billionaires, FORBES,
Mar. 11, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/wealthbillionaires#p-ls-arank--1_180.
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which comprises Italy's three largest private television channels."
Mediaset is part of Fininvest, a financial holding company founded by
Berlusconi and controlled by the Prime Minister's family, which
includes - among other entities - a major film production company,
Italy's largest publishing company, an insurance and banking
company, and Italy's most storied football club, AC Milan.14 Further,
before selling it to his brother, Berlusconi owned a leading daily
conservative newspaper, I Giornale. Political office aside, it is
difficult to overstate the degree to which Berlusconi touches the
everyday lives of Italians.
B. Past Cases and Controversies
As much as Berlusconi is known for his economic and political
largesse, his power has not protected him from legal scrutiny. Indeed,
the standing Prime Minister is the self-proclaimed "universal record-
holder for the number of trials in the entire history of man," and with
good reason." Although the extent of his legal troubles is difficult to
quantify, his own estimates are astounding. Between 1994 and 2011,
the Prime Minister purportedly spent $430 million on legal fees." In
2008, Berlusconi went on record with his contention that, over the
course of his political career, he had endured 2,500 court hearings,
and 577 "visits" from police." Charges against him have been largely
(though not completely) related to his media empire and other
financial holdings, and range from corruption to false accounting."
13. See Berlusconi in a Box, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2006, available at http://www.
economist.comlnode/7912736?storyid=7912736.
14. Fininvest board of directors includes three of Berlusconi's three oldest
children. Marina Berlusconi, his first born, is Chairman of the Board. See generally
FININVEST, http://www.fininvest.it/en/holdingboard_of_directors.
15. He also included all "other creatures who live on other planets." Rachel
Donadio, Italy Finds Lawyer Guilty of Taking a Bribe in Exchange for Protecting the
Premier, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A6.
16. Lorenzo Totaro, Berlusconi Approves Italian Justice Overhaul as
Prostitution Trial Looms, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 10 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-03-10/berlusconi-passes-italian-justice-overhaul-as-sex-trial-looms.html.
17. Berlusconi Counts Cost of Legal Battles, JAVNO, Jun. 25, 2008,
http://www.javno.com/en-world/berlusconi-counts-cost-of-legal-battles_159057.
18. For example, in 1996, Berlusconi went to trial to respond to allegation that
units of Fininvest had bribed government tax inspectors in exchange for favorable
audits. See John Tagliabue, Ex-Premier Goes on Trial In Man For Bribery, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at A3. Then, in 1997, Berlusconi was convicted of falsifying the
price of a film company bought by Fininvest in 1989, allegedly to set up a slush fund.
Celestine Bohlen, Former Italian Premier Found Guilty of Setting Up Slush Fund,
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Nonetheless, Berlusconi has evaded conviction in every case, proving
to be as elusive as he is controversial.19
Due to the time-intensive appeals process in Italy and general
judicial backlog, the running of the statute of limitations has served as
a protective shield for the Prime Minister.20 Over the past twenty
years, Berlusconi has evaded conviction by way of the statute of
limitations in at least four high-profile cases. In other cases where
the statute of limitations has not expired, the Prime Minister has
always been acquitted on appeal.22  At times, such acquittals have
come on the heels of new laws passed to retroactively decriminalize
the contested conduct.23 More recently, Berlusconi has come under
scrutiny for less savory conduct, including alleged ties to prostitution,
the placement of fashion models in political positions, consorting with
minors, and abuse of power.2 Over the years, he has also been
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1997, at A9. One year later, he was indicted on charges that he
had falsified books relating to the transfer of soccer star Gianluigi Lentini to his AC
Milan. See Associated Press, AC Milan's Owner Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
1998, at C7. See also infra Section V.C.3 for a explanation of current charges.
19. Berlusconi has never been definitively convicted. See Profile: Silvio
Berlusconi, Italian Prime Minister, BBC NEWS, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-europe-11981754.
20. In 1999, the average civil dispute took ten years from first instance to final
disposition in the Supreme Court. Vincenzo Varano, Machinery of Justice, in
INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 112 (Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo Mattei eds., 2002).
21. Berlusconi has gotten off by way of the statute of limitations for charges
related to false accounting in two cases, and bribing judges and financial police in two
others. See 0 & A: Berlusconi v the Courts, BBC NEWS, Jan. 14, 2010, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/7889288.stm.
22. See, e.g., Berlusconi Wins in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at A8; see also
High Court Clears Berlusconi in '87 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,2001, at A10.
23. Steve Scherer & Flavia Krause-Jackson, Berlusconi Acquitted After
Decriminalizing False Accounting, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a9Vs5.KFl78k.
24. In summer of 2009, La Repubblica published a series of recordings made by a
prostitute of her alleged encounters with Prime Minister Berlusconi at his official
residence. After he publicly attacked the newspaper, he was served with a writ
accusing him of abusing his office and seeking too much control over the media.
Berlusconi threatened to counter-sue for publishing the recordings. Josephine
McKenna & David Charter, Silvio Berlusconi Sued By Paper That Carried
Prostitute's Recordings, TIMES (London), Jul. 23, 2009, http://www.timesonline
.co.uk/toll news/world/europe/article6723875.ece. The Prime Minister's wife, to
whom he has been wed for twenty years, filed for divorce in 2009 in response to his
alleged interactions with an eighteen-year-old "female friend." Berlusconi's Wife to
Divorce Him, BBC NEWS, May 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/8031520.
stm. As of early 2011, proceedings are also pending against the Prime Minister in
connection with alleged juvenile prostitution and abuse of power. Ruby Red Face,
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accused of having close relationships with members of organized
*25crime.
Despite the broad scope of legal actions against him, Berlusconi
has never conceded wrongdoing in any case or controversy. Instead,
according to his accounting, his legal problems stem from a biased
judiciary and a relentless left-wing conspiracy against him and his
political machine. 26 However, perhaps admitting some culpability, yet
indicative of his unrepentant stance in the face of allegations,
Berlusconi explained in summer of 2009, "I am not a saint - everyone
understands that."27
C. Forza Italia: Berlusconi Enters Politics
1. First Term
In the wake of the mani pulite (literally, "clean hands") anti-
corruption campaign of the early 1990s - which exposed the breadth
of fraud and bribery that had long permeated Italian politics -
criminal prosecutions and resignations percolated throughout the
government, leaving a political void.' Taking advantage of his charm,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node
/18114883?storyid=18114883& CFID=161505590&CFTOKEN=69240952.
25. From 1978 to 1985, Berlusconi set up the twenty-two holding companies that
control Fininvest, injecting billions of lire into them, theoretically from Berlusconi's
own coffers. In 1997, a Mafia financier alleged that Berlusconi had used 20 billion
lire of Mafia money to build up his media empire. Investigators were not able to
determine the source of the much of the funds Berlusconi used over the years. With
access to the investigators' report, The Economist was unable to rule out Mafia ties
and money laundering. An Italian Story, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2001, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story-id=587107.
26. See The Law and Silvio Berlusconi, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at
A30; Stacy Meichtry & Alessandra Galloni, Italian Court Rulhng Deals Blow to
Berlusconi, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, at A10. Moreover, early in 2010, Berlusconi
referred to Italian judges as the Taliban bent on subverting democracy in its attempts
to undermine center-right legislative initiatives and his own agenda. Court Insists
That Silvio Berlusconi's Bribery Trial Must Continue Next Month, TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 27, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/Italy/7332333/Court-insists-Silvio-Berlusconis-bribery-trial-must-continue-
next-month.html.
27. Mckenna & Charter, supra note 24.
28. The mani pulite anti-corruption campaign was a sweeping national judicial
inquiry that exposed a far-reaching system of corruption - called tangentopoli
("bribesville") - which involved politicians, bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs.
Beginning in 1992, with the arrest of the socialist manager of a public hospice, the
investigation quickly expanded in scope throughout all of Italy. Within a couple of
years, six former Prime Ministers, more than five hundred members of Parliament,
440 [Vol. 34:2
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business savvy, and media presence, and under the flag of his newly
created Forza Italia political party, Berlusconi became Prime Minister
for the first time in 1994.29 When elected, he had little political
experience and had never held political office; the Italian public
seemed unconcerned, subscribing to his argument that his lack of
time in public office was an asset in the face of an unabashedly
corrupt political culture.30  Unfortunately for Italy, Berlusconi's
ascendency did not usher in a new era of clean or stable politics.
Soon after the Prime Minister's election, his brother was arrested on
corruption charges, later being convicted and sentenced to five
months in prison." Berlusconi himself was questioned by anti-graft
magistrates with regard to tax fraud on the part of Fininvest,
allegations with which he denied having any involvement.32 Further,
now that Berlusconi could exert control over public television,
opposition newspapers and government officials raised concerns
about potential conflicts of interest given the Prime Minister's near
complete control of the media. Only months after his election,
and several thousand local and public administrators were subject to investigation.
Months after it was initiated, most leading political figures resigned or went into
exile. So dramatic was the campaign that it marked the end of the First Italian
Republic. The long-term effect of manipulite on the level of political corruption in
Italy, however, is questionable at best. Alberto Vannucci, The Controversial Legacy
of 'Mani Pulite' A Critical Analysis of Italian Corruption and Anti-Corruption
Policies, 1 BULL. OF ITAL. POL. 233 - 34 (2009), available at http://www.gla.ac.uk/
media/media_140182-en.pdf.
29. Berlusconi created Forza Italia - appropriately named after the chant for the
Italian national soccer team - to serve his own political ambitions in the new system
of government that emerged following the corruption scandals of the early 1990s. He
did so by taking advantage of his vast financial resources, and by appealing to a
disenchanted electorate who saw in him the astuteness and good fortune lacking in
the leadership of the previous era. Naturally, his unique brand of celebrity and
influence over the media only helped his case. MICHAEL E. SHIN & JOHN A. AGNEW,
BERLUSCONI'S ITALY 1 - 2, 10 - 11 (2008).
30. Berlusconi's center-right alliance won 46 percent of the vote, with the largest
share going to Forza Italia, with 20 percent. See Alan Cowell, Italy's Right Wing
Heads for Victory in Landmark Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994, http://www.
nytimes.com/1994/03/29/world/italy-s-right-wing-heads-for-victory-in-landmark-vote.
html?scp=2&sq=&st=nyt; see also Alan Cowell, Rightest Voters in Italian Vote
Continue to Battle for Real Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, http://www.nytimes.
com/1994/03/30/world/rightist-victors-in-italian-vote-continue-battle-for-real-power.
html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt.
31. Paolo Berlusconi was convicted for paying illicit contributions worth $90,000
to a then-defunct political party. His sentence was suspended. Alan Cowell, Italian
Premier, Facing Defeat, Resigns Urging Elections, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994, at A10.
32. Id.
33. Though Berlusconi gave up the directorships of all of his Fininvest companies
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Forza Italia disintegrated amidst infighting, and he was forced to
resign in the face of an all-but-certain no-confidence vote.m
2. Second and Third Terms
Being unseated from office amidst legal and political controversy
31did nothing to dampen Berlusconi's appetite for political power.
Neither did the ensuing wave of indictments that would follow his exit
from office." Just fifteen months after the right swept into power on
the wings of change, a center-left coalition grabbed a historic victory,
defeating a challenge from Berlusconi and the right, and placing its
leader, Romano Prodi, in the Prime Minister's seat. It would not be
until 2001 that Berlusconi would find himself back at the helm of the
Council of Ministers, amazingly still palatable to Italians as a public
official, despite the panoply of indictments and convictions in the
preceding years. 38 His second term in office would last almost five
years - the longest of any post-World War II government - until
Prodi and the center-left unseated the magnate-turned-politician in
contentious national elections, continuing the game of political
leapfrog.
Two years following his second rise to leadership of the coalition
(save AC Milan) when he entered politics, he remained the controlling shareholder.
See An Italian Story, supra note 25. During his first term, Berlusconi would hand-
pick the head of RAI (Italy's public service broadcaster), who then, over the course
of the following months, changed the heads and the news teams of all three state
networks and installed two former Fininvest employees at the top of RAI channels 1
and 2. MARY L. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY 131-32 (2000).
34. Cowell, supra note 31.
35. Celestine Bohlen, Italian Left Wins Big Breakthrough In National Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1996, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/23/world/
italian-left-wins-big-breakthrough-in-national-vote.html.
36. From his first time in office - when Berlusconi's business empire became a
subject of the mani pulite investigations - until 1998, Berlusconi was charged,
independently, with illegal financing of a political party, corruption and bribing of
financial police, two counts of false accounting, as well as tax fraud, not to mention
investigations that did not reach trial. See An Italian Story, supra note 25.
37. Bohlen, supra note 35.
38. See Alessandra Stanley, Man in the News, Italy's Billionaire Victor, Silvio
Berlusconi, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at Al. Berlusconi was facing four separate
trials at the time that he entered office in 2001. SHIN & AGNEW, supra note 29, at
104.
39. The final results were extremely close: the final tally showed Prodi ahead by
only 0.1 percent of the vote. Ian Fisher, Berlusconi Says He Will Contest Italy Vote




government, Prodi would lose a no-confidence vote in the Italian
Senate and resign amidst the newest cycle of unrest in Italian
politics.' Once again proving his staying power and showing an
unparalleled ability to weather legal and political controversy,
Berlusconi returned to office in April 2008, capitalizing on a
fragmented left and increasing voter apathy.4' The embattled
billionaire Prime Minister remains in office today, though not without
scandal or intrigue. 42 His political future, however, has never been
more in question.43
III. The Italian Legal System and the Corte Costituzionale
The Italian court system, like that found in other civil law
countries, is characterized by a plurality of court hierarchies,
distinguishing it from common law jurisdictions, where there is a
single court hierarchy." Broadly, aside from those courts that deal
with specialized subjects,45 Italian courts are divided into two different
tracts: one for civil and criminal matters and another for
administrative or public law disputes.46 Legal disputes work their way
from the court of first instance (tribunale) to the intermediate appeals
court (corte d'appello), with final appeals going to the Italian
Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), which serves as the court of
last resort for non-constitutional issues.47 The Constitutional Court
(Corte Costituzionale), which heard its first case in 1956, is one of the
40. Prodi's resignation marked the end of the sixty-first government in Italy since
World War II. Ian Fisher & Elisabetta Povoledo, Surprising Few, Italy's
Government Collapses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at A3, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/01/25/world/europe/25italy.html.
41. See Ian Fisher, Economy Ailing, Frustrated Italy Picks Berlusconi, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/world/europe/15iht-15italy.
11989449.html.
42. For an overview of the most recent feminist revolt against the Prime Minister,
see Nancy Folbre, Feminists for the Italian Future, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG,
Feb. 21, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/feminists-for-the-italian-
future/?ref=silvioberlusconi.
43. 2010 saw Berlusconi only barely survive two confidence votes, saving his
government from collapse. See Silvio the Survivor, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2010,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/17155796; see also Elisabetta Povoledo,
Berlusconi Scandal Could Threaten Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at All.
44. Varano, supra note 20, at 99.
45. Id. at 99.
4 6. Id.
47. Id at 101.
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specialized courts and functions outside of the ordinary and
48
administrative court system.
The Italian Constitution provides for a single constitutional court
with the power of judicial review of legislation.49 The Constitutional
Court alone can pass judgment on the constitutionality of national
laws, regional laws, and government acts having the force of law.
Administrative regulations, however, are outside of its purview.'
Aside from this power to rule on the constitutionality of laws, the
Court has the authority to decide on conflicts relating to the
allocation of powers between the branches of government,
accusations against the President of the Republic, and on the
constitutionality of referendums." Cases come before the Court in
one of two ways. The first occurs when a party to a dispute raises a
constitutional issue during the course of normal litigation. In such a
case, the lower court proceedings are suspended, and the Court rules
on the constitutionality of the issue before remanding it back down
for disposition.52 Ninety percent of the cases that the Court hears are
by way of this indirect process." The alternate path is more direct:
Namely, that a party lodges a complaint directly with the Court. This
occurs in controversies between regions - or between the state and a
region - and in conflicts among the branches of government. 4 The
Court will also rule directly on popular referenda." Decisions of the
Court have the force of law and are binding on the entire court
16
system.
48. Id at 99.
49. Mario Comba, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 53
(Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo Mattei eds., 2002).
50. COSTITUZIONE [COST.][Constitution] art. 134 (Italy). An official English-
language version of the Italian Constitution can be found on the website of Senato
della Repubblica [Italian Senate], available at http://www.senato.it/documentil
repository/istituzione/costituzione inglese.pdf. Note that the legal and constitutional
system in Italy differs from that found in the United States, where the power to
interpret the constitution is diffused throughout the system. Comba, supra note 49,
at 54.
51. CosT. arts. 134, 138 (Italy).
52. VOLCANSEK, supra note 33, at 25.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Comba, supra note 49, at 55.
[Vol. 34:2444
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IV. Changing Conceptions of Official Immunity
A. Origins
As Berlusconi has spent the past decade of his political career in
pursuit of immunity from prosecution, it is useful to understand the
origins and development of immunity from a domestic and
international legal standpoint. Domestic immunity from suit for the
highest elected officials has its foundation in public policy, permitting
those charged with public service and policy-making to do so without
disturbance.17 When a head of state or other high-ranking official is
subjected to liability for acts while in office, any potential charges and
proceedings could disrupt the discharge of official duties,
theoretically at the expense of the office and, by extension, the
public." Moreover, being liable for all conduct would potentially
mean subjecting every decision and act to scrutiny, a reality that
would likely impact governmental efficiency and present substantial
problems of administrability. Given such concerns, the vast majority
of high-ranking governmental officials throughout the world enjoy a
qualified immunity from prosecution while in office."
Aside from its historical connection to the sovereign's power
over the people and the law, immunity from suit for official acts also
has its origins in international law. With the growth of international
diplomacy came the attendant need to ensure the safety and
inviolability of a country's diplomatic envoys abroad. Reciprocal
immunity from prosecution was a pragmatic and sensible way to
address the problem, especially as governments began to send and
receive officials for the conduct of international relations. Indeed,
diplomatic immunity is likely among the least controversial and most
57. In 2000, the Office of Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice
confirmed a long-held DOJ opinion that criminal prosecution of a sitting President
would undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its assigned
functions. See A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, Op. O.L.C., Oct. 16, 2000, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/
sitting-president.htm.
58. See generallyid.
59. Exposing a sitting chief of state to lawsuits is unusual outside of the U.S. See
Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 54 (1999). Most constitutions contain provisions granting
immunity to members of Parliament and the head of state, although such immunity is
generally functional and applicable only to official acts. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Italy
& France: Immunity for the Pnime Minister of Italy and the President of the French
Republic, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 107, 110 (2005).
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widely accepted principles in international law today.w Accordingly,
such immunities have been codified in the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, both of which contain provisions granting immunity to
certain cadres of a sending state's official personnel.6' Notably, the
immunities granted under the Conventions pertain only to official
conduct.62
B. Development of Immunity for Elected Officials
1. Parliamentary Immunity
Within democratic political systems, members of national
Parliaments generally enjoy immunity from prosecution for civil and
criminal offenses, again often in relation to acts that fall within the
scope of official duties." Such immunities are delineated either in a
country's constitution or under more specific domestic rules of
procedure.' Generally, a representative democracy will immunize
members of Parliament in one of two ways.65 First, under what is
often called the British model, such representatives can be protected
60. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (5th ed. 2003).
61. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Diplomatic]. Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations art. 43, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S 261 [hereinafter
Vienna Consular].
62. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides: A diplomatic
agent shall enjoy immunity from suit except in case of "an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
State outside his official functions." Vienna Diplomatic, supra note 61, art. 31(1)(c).
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides: consular officers and
employees are not amenable to the jurisdiction of the authorities of the receiving
State "in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions." Vienna
Consular, supra note 61, art. 43(1).
63. See Carmen Lane, Parliamentary Immunity and Democracy Development,
DEMOCRACY BRIEFS (DAI, D.C.), Aug. 2007, at 1.
64. See, e.g, Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law],
May 23, 1949, BGB1 I, art 46. (F.R.G.), English translation available at
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdfl80201000.pdf; see also Rules of Procedure of
the German Bundestag, Aug. 20, 2008, RGB1. I at 1712, Rule 107 (F.R.G.), English
translation available athttps://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdfl80060000.pdf.
65. See generally Simon Wigley, Parliamentary Immunity in Democratizing
Countries: The Case of Turkey, 31 HUM. RTs. Q. 567, 569 (2009); see also Lane, supra
note 63, at 2; U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], Parliamentary




by way of Parliamentary non-accountability." This type of immunity
has its origins in the 1689 English Bill of Rights which developed as a
response to interference in Parliamentary debates by the crown.
Non-accountability essentially immunizes a representative's
Parliamentary agency, i.e., actions or statements that a representative
makes in his or her capacity as an elected lawmaker." Any illegal
activity that does not occur within this protective sphere, then, would
fall outside of the purview of Parliamentary non-accountability. This
scheme of Parliamentary immunity has typically been adopted by
countries that were subject to British colonization.
Under a second approach, members of Parliament can be
protected by a scheme of Parliamentary inviolability which makes a
representative's nonlegislative activity conditionally immune.0
Historically, this broader scope of immunity arose and developed in
France following the 1789 Revolution, where members of the
National Assembly were seen as holding positions that were superior
to other bodies of the State.71 Under this model, nonlegislative acts or
statements can typically only provide the basis for prosecution if
Parliament consents, if the representative is caught in the act of
committing the offense, or if the representative is no longer in office.72
This approach to immunity for members of Parliament, known as the
Continental or French model, is followed by the majority of the
world's democracies and tends to be combined with aspects of non-
accountability under the British model.73 Italy's system adheres more
closely to this broader approach than to that of the British model,
though Berlusconi would undoubtedly like it to extend further.
66. USAID, supra note 65, at 3.
67. Marilia Crespo Allen, Parliamentary Immunity in the Member States of the
European Union and in the European Parliament, at 8 (July 1999), available at
http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/European%20Parliament% 20-% 20
Parliamentary%20Immunity%20in%20the%2OMember%2OStates% 2 00f%20the% 2
OEuropean%20Union%20and%20in%20the%2OEuropean%2Parliament% 20-%
201999%20-%20EN%20-%20PI.pdf.
68. See Wigley, supra note 65, at 569 - 70; USAID, supra note 65, at 3.
69. See Wigley, supra note 65, at 569.
70. Id. at 570.
71. See Allen, supra 67, at 8.
72. See Wigley, supra note 65, at 570.
73. See id. at 569; see also CosT. art. 68 (Italy), which outlines aspects of both
non-accountability and inviolability.
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2. Head of State Immunity
From a domestic standpoint, heads of state generally enjoy
similar - if not enhanced - immunity from prosecution as that
conferred upon members of Parliament.74 Any differences in the
scope of immunity for heads of state are likely the result of practical
considerations attendant to carrying out official duties. Head of state
immunity often finds its basis in a country's constitution, or as in the
case of the U.S., from the powers and responsibilities inherent in a
constitutional structure. In general, heads of state will likely evade
domestic prosecution for crimes committed while in office except in
cases of treason, though the power to decide liability (or to impeach)
is often in the hands of the legislature or Parliament. Moreover,
practical and political considerations regarding prosecuting a head of
state may prevent charges from ever being brought.
Despite these broad trends, the past two decades have seen a
considerable drawback in the prevailing standard of relative executive
immunity. Moreover, the emergent International Criminal Court
(ICC) - which was formed for the purpose of prosecuting individuals
for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity - has shown a
growing global consensus in favor of holding top government officials
accountable for certain in-office conduct.7 ' The creation and
expansion of international judicial proceedings against heads of state
has coincided with a rise in the displacement of high-level public
74. Note that, oftentimes, the head of state is in fact a member of Parliament, as
in Italy.
75. The U.S. Department of Justice has interpreted the U.S. Constitution as
conferring broad immunity upon the president for reasons of separation of powers
and effective execution of presidential duties. See A Sitting President's Amenability
to Indictment, supra note 57.
76. See the French Constitution's provision on the liability of the President of the
French Republic during office. 1958 LA CONSTITUTION [CONST.] art. 68 (Fr.); see
also COST. arts. 90, 96 (Italy). It is important to note that this does not preclude
liability outside of the country for violation of international laws as defined under the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
77. No fewer than sixty-seven heads of state have been formally prosecuted for
serious human rights violations or economic crimes committed during their
administration since 1990. Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger, Introduction, in
PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE 2 (Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger eds., 2009).
78. As of October 2010, there are 114 countries that are parties to the Rome
Statute. ICC, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/




officials within countries, most often for economic crimes. 9 During
the 1990s, Europe in particular saw a jump in corruption scandals that
aided in unseating several heads of state.? Around that time, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and most European countries adopted treaties to stem the rise in
bribery and inappropriate use of funds that appeared to be
permeating the political and corporate classes of the continent.
Finally, the United Nations responded in kind with the Convention
on Corruption, which entered into force on December 14, 2005, and
requires member states to adopt measures to criminally punish
national public officials for, inter alia, bribery, misappropriation of
public funds, and obstruction of justice.' Clearly, international
momentum - and an increase in domestic willingness to hold those in
power accountable - suggests that holding office no longer creates an
impermeable barrier to prosecution.
V. Berlusconi's Enduring Fight for Immunity from
Prosecution
A. History of Italian Immunity Law
Until the past decade, immunity has historically been all but
expressly disallowed for Italy's top government officials. The starting
79. Lutz & Reiger, supra note 77, at 8 - 9.
80. Aside from the inquires and charges that accompanied the mani pulite
investigations in the early to mid 1990s in Italy, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
was implicated in a huge slush around the same time, and Spanish Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez lost power due to corruption. Since 1994, more than six hundred
French politicians, including former Prime Ministers and elected representatives have
been prosecuted or charged. Arnauld Miguet, Political Corruption and Party
Funding in Western Europe, 1 - 3 (April 2004), prepared following the Transparency
International Western Europe group meeting, Athens, Greece, Sept. 13-15, 2002,
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/5466/31891/file/political-corruption-p
artyjfinancing-western-eu-overview.pdf.
81. Council of Europe [CE], Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27,
1999, CETS 173. As of March 10, 2011, all but five of the Members States of the CE
have ratified the convention. See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Council
of Europe, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.
asp?NT=173&CM=&DF=&CL=EN; Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development [OECD], Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 ILM 1, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf.
82. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, arts. 15, 17,
25, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/
documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
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off point for an analysis of liability for holders of Italy's highest public
offices is the Italian Constitution, which was enacted in December
1947 and came into force January 1, 1948. Since that time there have
been several amendments, though Parliamentary Commissions
charged with preparing more substantial revisions to the original text
have failed for lack of political consensus.' The Italian Constitutional
provisions that pertain to immunity for officeholders are those
relating to equality before the law (Article 3), qualified Parliamentary
immunity (Article 68), presidential impeachment (Article 90),
ministerial liability to suit (Article 96), and constitutional amendment
(Article 138)." Most directly, under Article 96, the Prime Minister
(president of the council of ministers) and the ministers are "subject
to normal justice for crimes committed in the exercise of their duties,"
with the one qualification that authorization for such "justice" be
given by one of the houses of Parliament.86
B. Berlusconi's First Attempt at Immunity: Lex Berlusconi
Given the legal controversies that plagued Berlusconi in and out
of office, it is not surprising that he would be the first Prime Minister
to attempt to change the framework of immunity for Italy's highest
public servants. In June of 2003, perhaps not coincidentally when the
rotating presidency of the European Union fell to Italy, the Italian
Senate passed what is referred to as the Schifani Law, named after
the Senator that had authored the legislation, Renato Schifani.87 The
law, entitled "Provisions for the adjustment of Article 68 of the
Constitution concerning criminal proceedings with regard to high
state office," conferred immunity from prosecution while in office
upon Italy's five highest-ranking government officials: the president
of the republic, the presidents of both houses of Parliament, the
president of the Constitutional Court, and the Prime Minister
83. Mario Einaudi, The Constitution of the Italian Republic, 42 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 675 - 76 (1948).
84. Comba, supra note 49, at 58 - 59.
85. COST. arts. 3, 68, 90, 96, 138 (Italy).
86. COST. art 96 (Italy).
87. Backers of the immunity law said that its purpose was to reduce politically
motivated prosecutions and to spare Italy the possible humiliation of Berlusconi
being convicted during the second half of the year, when Italy held the rotating
presidency. See Frank Bruni, Italian Leader, in a First, Testifies at His Own Bribery




(president of the Council of Ministers).m The terms of the law were
expansive: It exempted the named positions from prosecution for any
crime, even those concerning events that took place prior to
assumption of office; suspended any trials that were ongoing; and
provided that the statutes of limitation for any pending offense were
to run during the term of office." Notably, only one of those covered
under the law was facing criminal charges - Prime Minister
Berlusconi.9 As the Schifani Law had the effect of halting criminal
proceedings against the sitting Prime Minister - and rotating
president of the European Union - it is no surprise that the law was
soon thereafter referred to as lex Berlusconi9' The prime justification
for the law then - that it would enable selected government officials
to perform their functions without disturbance while in office -
seems, retrospectively, questionable in application.'
Due to the law's constitutional shortcomings, however, it would
be struck down for reasons other than the questionable basis upon
which it was enacted. In January of 2004, the Italian Constitutional
Court, after hearing challenges to lex Berlusconi, invalidated the law,
finding it violative of two central provisions of the Italian
Constitution - those that guarantee equality before the law and due
process. 3 A few months later, a corruption trial against Berlusconi
would resume, though to little effect. 94
88. Gazz. Uff., 21 Jun. 2003, n.142, Legge, 20 Jun. 2003, n.140, available at
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggil031401.htm. Title is translated from original
Italian: "Disposizioni per l'attuazione dell'articolo 68 della Costituzione nonche' in
meteria di processi penali nei confronti delle alte cariche dello Stato."
89. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 59, at 109.
90. See Bruni, supra note 87.
91. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 59, at 109.
92. Id. at 110.
93. Racc. uff. corte cost. judgment no. 24 of Jan. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2004/0024s-04.html; see also Brianne Biggiani,
Designs for Immunity A Compaison of the Criminal Prosecution of United States
Presidents & Italian Prime Ministers, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 209, 221
(2006).
94. Berlusconi was charged with bribing judges in relation to a take-over battle
for publisher Mondadori. The case was eventually thrown out because the statute of
limitations on the alleged offense expired. Q & A: Berlusconi v the courts, supra
note 21.
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C. Berlusconi's Second Attempt at Immunity: Lex Berlusconi
Reprise
1. The Law: Lodo Alfano
While it took two years for the media mogul to regain the
premiership, it only took him and his backers two months to get
another immunity law on the books, this time authored by the
Minister of Justice, Angelino Alfano." Article 1 of lodo Alfano, as
the law became known, suspended criminal proceedings against
Italy's four highest officeholders until the end of their terms, covering
trials based on alleged offenses that occurred both during and prior to
taking office.96 Article 1(1) read:
Without prejudice to the cases governed by Articles 90 and 96 of
the Constitution, any criminal proceedings against individuals
which occupy the offices of the President . .. or Prime Minister
shall be suspended from the time when the office or function is
taken up until the end of the term in office. The suspension shall
also apply to criminal proceedings for conduct prior to taking up
the office or function.97
Sub-section 7 of Article 1 applied to any proceedings that may be
ongoing against the offices covered: "[t]he provisions of the present
Article shall also apply to criminal proceedings in progress, at every
stage, state or instance, at the time when the present law enters into
force."98 Interestingly, the text and scope of the law effectively
mirrored the flaws that existed in lexBerlusconi, although the newest
versions froze the statutes of limitations rather than letting them run
while in office. Once again, the Prime Minister was the only person
covered by the law who was currently facing criminal proceedings."
Nonetheless, the law's passage did not come as a great surprise to
much of Italy, as the country had seen Berlusconi dodge controversy
95. The law worked its way through Parliament in a record twenty-five days.
Nick Pisa, Silvio Berlusconi Immune from Prosecution While in Office After Law
Passed, TELEGRAPH (London), Jul. 22, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/italy/2446529/Silvio-Berlusconi-immune-from-prosecution-while-
in-office-after-law-passed.html.
96. Gazz. Uff., 25 jul. 2008, n.173, Legge, 23 jul. 2008, n.124, available at
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/081241.htm.
97. Id. art. 1(1), translated from original Italian.
98. Id. art. 1(7), translated from original Italian.
99. MPs Pass Berlusconi Immunity Bill, BBC NEWS, Jul. 11, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hileurope/7501825.stm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
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and reemerge time and again, tanned and reinvigorated.1? While the
justifications for the law mimicked those given for the Schifani Law,
the timing of the law - and indeed the pace at which it made its way
through Parliament - was unlikely a coincidence. The corruption trial
against Berlusconi for the alleged bribing of a British lawyer was
coming to a close.101 Members of the opposition did not hide their
skepticism about the stated purposes of the law, calling it an "ad
personam" law meant to protect the Prime Minister alone.1n Though
lodo Alfano would remain in effect for more than twice as long its
predecessor, it could not evade review by the Constitutional Court.
2. The Constitutional Court's Response to Lodo Alfano
On September 26, 2008, Milan prosecutors brought a challenge
to the immunity law, alleging constitutional violations under Articles
3 and 138, those dealing with equality and the amendment process,
respectively.103 In its referral order to the Constitutional Court, the
Milan tribunal argued that the passage of the law contravened Article
3 because selectively limiting liability creates a tiered system and
undermines the principle of equality before the law." Further, the
tribunal contended that because the law impacted the privileges of
constitutional organs, it could only have been adopted by way of
amendment to the constitution.' Rather than employing the
amendment process, however, the drafters of lodo Alfano introduced
it as a piece of ordinary legislation.
Defenders of the law, joined by the Prime Minister at trial,
argued that the contested provision was constitutional because strict
100. The newspaper La Repubblica was quoted saying "Only in Italy could such
an anomaly be passed." Pisa, supra note 95.
101. Richard Owen, New Law Gives Silvio Berlusconi Immunity from
Prosecution, TIMEs (London), Jun. 27, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/europearticle4225476.ece.
102. Pisa, supra note 95.
103. Racc. uff. corte cost. judgment n.262 of oct. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.Cortecostituzionale.it/documentildownload/doc/recent-judgments/S20092
62_ AmiranteGallo.doc. Author relied upon translation of Italian Constitutional
Court Decision 262 of 2009 as provided by the Court's website according to the URL
above. Citations to the decision will be made with reference to sections as they
appear in the original and translated version. Decision 262 of 2009 is divided, as per
tradition, into two larger sections: first, Facts of the Case (Facts), and second,
Conclusions of Law (Law). References will include in which of these two larger
sections, Facts or Law, the specific section numbers can be located.
104. Id. §§ 1.4-1.5 (Law).
105. Id. § 1.2 (Law).
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equality before the law does not exist, and certain immunities were
already present within the Constitution. They based their argument
on two grounds. First, Articles 68 and 90, which speak to functional
immunity for members of Parliament and the President of the
Republic, already partially remove officials from susceptibility to
prosecution." Second, Article 96, which covers the Prime Minister,
provides for the stripping of immunity - and leveraging of charges -
only in the case that one of the houses of Parliament approves it. 07
Additionally, the law contained a provision by which an official could
waive immunity in order to defend himself against charges, itself an
inviolable right under Article 111 of the Constitution.as The defense
also asserted that the prosecution should be barred from asserting a
violation under Article 138 because the amendment provision had not
been cited in the Court's invalidation of the Schifani Law.' 9 Finally,
as a general justification for the law, the defense pointed to the fact
that such immunity is firmly rooted in international law and
incorporated into the Constitution by way of Article 10.n0
The Constitutional Court rejected the defense's assertions of
constitutionality with regards to Articles 3 and 138. Relying partially
on the basis for its decision on lex Berluscom, the Court held that
while the Constitution did confer prosecutorial privilege upon some
offices, such exceptions were in regard to official conduct - rather
than the blanket immunity of lodo Alfano - and had a precise basis in
the Constitution itself."' Moreover, the privileges promulgated under
the contested law undermined specific constitutional provisions by
granting greater protection to the Prime Minister than it did to other
ministers.112 As to Article 138, the Court stated that while Parliament
is free to enact ordinary legislation that implements procedures which
relate to extant constitutional provisions, it was not permitted to
enact ordinary legislation governing immunity."' Further, the fact
that the amendment provision did not find its way into the Court's
decision in January of 2004 did not bar its application in the present
106. Id. § 2.2.1 (Facts).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 2.2.3 (Facts).
109. Id. § 1.2.1 (Facts).
110. Id. § 2.2.5 (Facts).
111. Id. §§ 7.3.2.3.1-7.3.3 (Law).
112. Id. § 7.3.2.3.1 (Law).
113. Id. § 7.3.1 (Law).
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case; there is no requirement that every possible constitutional
argument be leveraged against a particular law in a finding of
unconstitutionality.1 4  Finally, the Court rejected the defense's
arguments concerning international law by drawing a distinction
between diplomatic immunity - which did have a sound basis in
international law - and the domestic immunity of ministers and
presidents of constitutional bodies - on which international law had
no bearing."' Accordingly, on October 7, 2009, the Constitutional
Court declared Law No. 124 of 2008 unconstitutional under Articles 3
and 138, in relation to the privileges contained in Articles 68, 90, and
96."' Absent a constitutional amendment, the grant of immunity to
government officials was invalid.
In line with his normal defense, the Prime Minister criticized the
decision in televised remarks, calling the Court a "political organ"
and accusing the opposition and press of conspiring against him."'
Showing his usual gusto in the face of controversy, Berlusconi
beamed: "I feel reinvigorated.... Long live Italy! Long live
Berlusconi!"18
3. The Decision's Impact on Berlusconi:
The Trials Must (Surely) Go On
The most immediate effect in the wake of the Court's 2009 ruling
was that Berlusconi became a private citizen before the law, meaning
that pending trials would (theoretically) be able to proceed against
him."9 Three trials had been suspended following the law's passage in
the summer of 2008.120
In the first case, prosecutors alleged that Berlusconi had paid
British lawyer David Mills $600,000 to give false testimony regarding
the Prime Minister's offshore financial activities. 2' In February of
2009, Mills was convicted in an Italian court in relation to the bribe
and received a four-and-a-half year sentence, a decision he vowed to
114. Id. § 7.2 (Law).
115. Id. § 7.3.1 (Law).
116. Id. § 8 (Law).
117. Editorial, The Law and Silvio Berlusconi, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A30.
118. Meichtry & Galloni, supra note 26.
119. But see infra Section V.D.
120. The Law and Silvio Berlusconi, supra note 117.
121. Id.
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appeal. 122 Notably, Berlusconi had been a co-defendant in the case
until his immunity came through."' Mills appealed the decision, and
the case came before Italy's highest appeals court on February 25,
2010.124 In a blow to prosecutors, the court held that the alleged bribe
occurred in 1999 - rather than in 2000 as the lower courts had found -
resulting in the expiration of the ten-year statute of limitations. 125
This had particular import for Berlusconi, whose trial on the same
corruption charges was supposed to restart on February 27, 2010,
following a postponement granted to await a final resolution of the
Mills case.126  The court's decision implied that the statute of
limitations in the Prime Minister's trial would expire in spring of 2011,
at the latest.127 While the disposition of the case against the British
lawyer had been hailed as a victory for Berlusconi, the high court
found that Mills did in fact receive the payment.128 Progress in the
Prime Minister's trial, originally set to continue on March 26, 2010,129
has been stymied by further legal impediments,' though a hearing
occurred on March 21, 2011.1" Due to the delay, the statute of
122. Donadio, supra note 15.
123. Id.
124. Berlusconi Trial Suspended, UPI, Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top-
News/International/2010/01/15/Berlusconi-trial-suspended/UPI-13211263596729/.
125. Richard Owen, Berlusconi's Victory in Mills Court Case Is only a Hollow
One, TIMES (London), Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tollnews/world/
world-agenda/article7042658.ece.
126. The court also denied the defense's motion to throw out evidence already
presented during Mills's trials, including that which allegedly showed the Prime
Minister having authorized the payment to Mills. Berlusconi Trial Suspended, supra
note 124.
127. See Stacy Meichtry, Italy Throws Out Tial of Berlusconi Lawyer, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 26, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB100014240527487
04479404575087744045529452.html. Note that this was altered by subsequent
legislation. See infra Section V.D.
128. Id.
129. Nick Squires, Court Insists Silvio Berlusconi's Bribery Trial Must Continue
Next Month, TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 27, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/italy/7332333/Court-insists-Silvio-Berlusconis-bribery-trial-must-
continue-next-month.html.
130. See infra Section V.D.
131. However, due to an emergency meeting on the ongoing crisis in Libya,
however, the Italian Prime Minister was unable to attend. Libya: Silvio Berlusconi





limitations will now likely expire in February of 2012.132
The second case involves accusations of tax fraud and false
accounting by Mediaset in relation to a series of transactions carried
out by the Prime Minister's company in the 1990s. 33  Along with
eleven named co-defendants (Mills among them), Berlusconi is
accused of using offshore companies to purchase American television
and movie rights, then reselling them at inflated rates to Mediaset,
lowering its tax payments.134 Mediaset has maintained that the film
rights were purchased at market prices and that any trial will bear
that out."' February 28, 2011, marked the most recent hearing in the
case.136 If somehow Berlusconi is ever convicted of the charges, he
would face from eighteen months to six years in prison.
Additionally, Berlusconi has been accused of embezzlement and
tax fraud related to Mediaset, allegedly having had a hand in causing
damage to shareholders and evading taxes. 38 The most recent
hearing in this case occurred on March 5, 2011."'
D. Berlusconi's Third Attempt at Immunity: Legal Reform
1. Legitimate Impediment Law
Faced with ever-increasing legal pressures in the wake of losing
his immunity from prosecution, the Italian Prime Minister sought to
reform Italy's judicial system in order to protect himself from what he
deemed an overly political judiciary, bent on his destruction.4 In the
132. John Hooper, Silvio Berlusconi Back on Trial as Tax Fraud Court Case
Resumes in Italy, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 28, 2011, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/28/silvio-berlusconi-court-cases-resume.
133. The Law and Silvio Berlusconi, supra note 117.
134. Id.
135. Frances D'emilio, Latest Probe of Berlusconi Completed, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 23, 2010, available at http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/newscontent.
php?id=1162777&lang=eng-news&cate-img=83.jpg&caterss=newsPolitics.
136. Hooper, supra note 132.
137. Id
138. Amelia Mathias, Italy's PM Berlusconi May Face Third Corruption Trial:
Reports, JURIST, Jan. 24, 2010, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edulpaperchase/
2010/01/italy-pm-berlusconi-may-face-third.php.
139. Berlusconi was not present in court however and the trial was adjourned until
April 11, 2011. Paolo Biondi & James Mackenzie, Berlusconi to Appear in Court in
Person, Ally Says, REUTERS, Mar. 15, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/03/15/us-italy-berlusconi-trial-idUSTRE72E6U320110315
140. Richard Owen, Silvio Berlusconi Returns to Draft New Immunity Laws,
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wake of the 2009 Constitutional Court decision, Berlusconi supported
two draft bills, each of which would have an effect on his current and
potential future legal battles. The first, which was approved by
Parliament on March 10, 2010, and is known as the "legitimate
impediment" law,'141 permits cabinet members - Berlusconi included -
to postpone criminal proceedings against them on the grounds that
they would interfere with official duties." A second law, which was
approved on January 19, 2010, by the upper house and intended to
make the Italian justice system more efficient, would end trials that
fail to reach a first-instance sentence within two years.143 This latter
effort by Berlusconi appears to have been stalled in Parliament,
perhaps permanently.1"
In the short term, the successfully passed legitimate impediment
law effectively solved Berlusconi's pending legal problems in the
wake of the 2009 Constitutional Court decision. The law was artfully
crafted: when invoked, it served to automatically delay trials against
high-ranking officials, barring review by the court.1' As such, despite
his supposed new status as a private citizen following the reversal of
lodo Alfano, the Prime Minister regained his advantage and the trials
against him were once again put on hold."'
2. The Constitutional Court's Response to the
Legitimate Impediment Law
On January 13, 2011, seven years after it struck down lex
Berlusconi, the Constitutional Court registered its latest
pronouncement against the Prime Minister.147 In a twelve-to-three
TIMES (London), Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/europe/article6983862.ece.
141. Gazz. Uff., 8 apr. 2010, n.81, Legge, 7 apr. 2010, n.51.
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HANDESLBLAD (The Netherlands), Feb. 4, 2010, available at http://www.nrc.nl/
international/article2475746.ece/Berlusconi-closetorenewedjlegal-immunity; see
also Guy Dinmore, Berlusconi Wins Repieve, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 10,
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ruling, the Court rejected crucial parts of the legitimate impediment
law, most importantly revoking the automatic immunity that the law
conferred upon cabinet ministers.' Under the law as written, trial
judges had no discretion to reject an official's assertion of a legitimate
impediment to mounting a defense.149 The Court decision, while not
voiding the law in its entirety, permits lower court judges to
determine whether or not the excuse is valid."(o Following an adverse
decision, then, a defendant has a right to appeal to the Constitutional
Court for a final determination on the matter."' The ruling also
modifies the law to permit only six months of postponement of
charges, rather than the eighteen months as originally specified."2
Unlike the prior court decisions on immunity, the January 2011 ruling
leaves a potential partial immunity intact for Berlusconi and other top
officials. A familiar situation confronts the Prime Minister: Trials
against him are once again set to move forward, albeit at an
undetermined pace. On top of the three fraud and tax-related cases
pending, Berlusconi is now charged with abuse of power and juvenile
prostitution, which carry maximum sentences of three and twelve
years in prison.'53 The Prime Minister has called the accusations
groundless and the judiciary guilty of mounting a "moral coup."' 54
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2011/0023s-11.html.
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VII. The Impact of the Court's Decisions on Italy
A. Endorsement of Democracy and the Rule of Law
Berlusconi has thrice been rebuked by the Constitutional Court.
Although not enough to instill in the Italian people complete faith in
the rule of law and proper functioning of government, it signals that
the Republic's foundational document is intact and relatively
inviolable. Important in the Court's rulings - especially the decision
of October 6, 2009, regarding lodo Alfano - is the assertion that the
measures themselves, while independently repugnant to the
constitution, may not have been had they been brought about in a
constitutional manner - that is, as an amendment."' In sending the
message that the document has teeth, the Court showed that there is
some semblance of legitimacy left in the Italian judiciary, despite its
shortcomings. Berlusconi's attempts to undermine such legitimacy by
claiming that the Court is politically biased flies in the face of a ruling
that, in fact, bolsters its integrity and impartiality.
Democracy was a central aspect of the Court's decision on lodo
Alfano. In holding the law unconstitutional under, inter alia, Article
3 of the constitution, the Court looked to its pronouncement on lex
Berlusconi in January of 2004. There, in invalidating the previous
attempt at immunity, the Court held that that "no constitutional
law ... may subvert one of the fundamental principles of the modern
state governed by the rule of law, consisting in the equal status of
citizens before the courts. .. .""' By firmly upholding the guarantees
of Article 3 in its decision of October 2009, the Court made an
important endorsement of democracy. Regardless of the depth and
scope of Berlusconi's power, wealth and influence cannot
constitutionally place an individual above the law. The Prime
Minister has chided the Constitutional Court for undermining his
legitimacy without the support of the people; judges for the Court are
appointed and not elected."' Of course, the irony is that he is
155. CosT. art. 138 (Italy).
156. Corte Costituzionale [Constitutional Court], 7 Oct. 2009, § 3.1.3 (Facts),
translation available at http://www.Cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/
recent-judgments/S2009262_AmiranteGallo.doc.
157. Berlusconi has made it clear that he considers his own authority more
legitimate than that of the Constitutional Court by nature of having been elected.
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criticizing the Court for blocking his attempt to place himself above
the people, in contravention of the constitution. While the Prime
Minister has worked to remove himself from the normal reach of the
court system - and by way of delay and alleged corruption of judges
has effectively succeeded in that pursuit - there are some limits to his
capacity to do so, however meager they may be. The Court's
unambiguous decision on lodo Alfano - as well as its reliance on
similar reasoning in revoking parts of the legitimate impediment law -
reinforces democracy and the rule of law in Italy, regardless of how or
whether pending trials proceed against Berlusconi.
B. Identification of Areas That Need Reform
1. Judicial Efficiency
The administration of justice in Italy is seriously hampered by
delay. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century, a civil dispute
averaged roughly ten years from first instance to final disposition in
the Supreme Court."' One of the above-mentioned reforms currently
making its way through Parliament - at the behest of Berlusconi -
seeks to address this backlog of cases by terminating delayed trials
rather than improving the mechanisms of justice.' This measure
could be seen as an indirect attempt to spur greater efficiency,
although it suggests a submission to the flaws of the system rather
than an effort to address them. The Prime Minister serves as an
excellent case study in the potential dangers of judicial backlog and
delay. Certainly, statutes of limitation serve the worthy goals of
fairness and due process, enshrined in Article 111 of the
constitution.' However when such limits work against the
Massimo Franco, La Sentenza della Corte Costituzionale: I Danni di un conflitto
[Constitutional Court Ruling: Fall-out From A Clash], CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Oct.
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Italy Judges Walk Out over Proposed Judicial Reforms Favoring Berlusconi, JURIST,
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disposition of a case on the merits - and certainly, the trial against
Mills provides a recent example - it is hard to deny that more
substantive reform is in order. This is not to say that all those whose
trials are expunged by reason of the passage of time would have been
found guilty. Nor is it to suggest that the Italian judicial and political
system - or Europe more generally - is not acutely aware of problems
that plague the efficient resolution of cases in Italy.' Viewing the
situation from the standpoint of an aggrieved complainant, rather
than from that of a well-connected media mogul, the argument for
accelerating the rate of justice has never been more apparent.
On the point of an independent and efficient judiciary, the Prime
Minister himself has begun to take tangible, legislative steps with an
eye toward reform. On March 10, 2011, the Prime Minister and his
cabinet approved a measure that would allow citizens to sue judges
for miscarriage of justice as well as give Parliament greater scope to
intervene in the judiciary.162 Such a measure would require changes to
Italy's Constitution and therefore needs two-thirds approval from
both houses of Parliament to go into effect.163 Opponents of this and
other related bills that are rumored to be in the works have labeled
such reform attempts as, perhaps ironically, undermining the
autonomy and independence of the judiciary.'" At least on its face,
the newly-approved bill seems to provide further avenues for
challenging judicial pronouncements, should one be so inclined.
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2. Conflicts of Interest
It is difficult to examine Berlusconi's political career without
some regard for the conflicts of interest that were attendant to his rise
to power. Whether or not he wielded his vast fortune and domain
over Italian media to the detriment of the office of Prime Minister,
the coupling of his financial and political power has, at the very least,
presented the opportunity for abuse. As Berlusconi has ultimately
avoided conviction, it may be unfair to presume that, absent alleged
meddling and stall tactics, he would have been found guilty at some
point over the past two decades. Nonetheless, it seems puerile to
attribute his penchant for being on the receiving end of criminal
charges to mere judicial bias or left-wing conspiracy. The mere fact
that such conflicts of interest were present upon Berlusconi's entry
into politics - and have persevered throughout his protracted tenure
at the helm of the center-right - is an argument for approaching
candidates with similar means and influence more skeptically in the
future.
VIII. Conclusion
In the face of unrelenting controversy and in the wake of the
Constitutional Court's invalidation of lodo Alfano and the legitimate
impediment law, Berlusconi has promised to stay on as Prime
Minister."' Given the legal reforms that appear to be progressing
through Parliament, and his history of evasiveness, there appears to be
little reason to doubt his confidence. Despite his likely place among
the most prosecuted individuals in history - a distinction he seems to
carry with a sense of pride - Berlusconi has managed to evade the grips
of the Italian justice system at every turn. Regardless of this success,
and perhaps because of it, the Prime Minister has exposed the
ramifications of a sclerotic and delay-ridden justice system. Riding into
office in 1994 on a platform of reform and integrity, Berlusconi
promised to usher in a new era of responsible politics in Italy. Fifteen
years later it is not clear that he has even approached that goal. The
Constitutional Court took an important stand in rejecting his efforts to
place himself and Italy's other top officials above the law. Whether or
not the decisions will engender a reversal of fortune for the embattled
Prime Minister, they showed that his power is not without limit.
165. Berlusconi has "no intention of stepping down, whatever the court's ruling"
on legitimate impediment law. Povoledo & Pianigiani, supra note 7.
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